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model of people searching for marriage partners in which ageing and fertility 
propensities determine marriage probabilities. We apply our model to a quantitative 
analysis of the post-war marriage boom that began in France in 1918. We find that 
wartime shocks to the marriage market are perpetuated across generations and cause 
persistent increases in marital birthrates. Heterogeneity in women’s propensity to bear 
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1 INTRODUCTION
The First World War, which ended in November 1918, significantly disrupted the demo-
graphic processes of European countries. In France, which saw a large share of the fighting,
and suﬀered a long occupation, marriage rates and marital fertility fell by about 50% during
the war. The end of the war saw both marriage and marital birth rates peak dramatically
above their pre-war trends. What is more surprising however is the duration of the disrup-
tion; marriage rates did not fall back to their pre-war trend until the late 1920s, and marital
fertility remained markedly above its pre-war trend well into the 1930s.1
We stress the protracted nature of the post-war adjustment because we take this as evidence
of the importance of frictions in the matching process. In our empirical analysis below, we
show evidence that the disruption of the marriage and birth patterns extends to the younger,
non-mobilized cohorts more than ten years after the end of the war 2. While frictions in pair-
wise transactions are often asserted to be important in economics, Burdett and Coles (1999)
argue that it is in the formation of long-term relationships, such as marriage, that we should
expect matching frictions to play the strongest role. Aiyagari et al. (2000) and Fernandez et
al. (2005) showed that economic models of marriage based on search frictions can successfully
account for patterns of marital sorting in the US and around the world, respectively. This
approach can be extended to explain cross-sectional patterns in fertility and female labor
supply, as demonstrated by Caucutt et al. (2002).
In this paper we propose a search-theoretic model of marriage and births that generates
long periods of adjustment to one-time demographic shocks. We then ask to what extent
the model can account for the transition in post-war France. Our analysis is based on three
key economic insights. First, disruption of the marriage market results in an unusually high
concentration of singles with a high propensity to marry. This may explain the high marriage
rates of women after the war. Second, the scarcity of men in one generation, resulting from
the casualties of war, is transmitted, via the resource constraint, to future generations. This
may explain the protracted nature of the transition. Third, the propensity to marry is
closely linked, or may even be identical to, the propensity to have children. Thus the post-
war increase in marital birth rates may be due, at least in part, to the unusual composition
1This pattern, of a war-time marriage bust followed by a protracted marriage boom, has been character-
istic of France since at least the Napoleonic era, as Chasteland and Pressat (1962) make clear. Festy (1984)
documents the eﬀects of the Great War on birth rates in France, and Caldwell (2004) reports that these
eﬀects are not specific to France and World War I, but instead are common to many countries during various
conflicts, civil wars and revolutions.
2France is special not just in its prolonged exposure to the war, but also in the richness of its historical
vital statistics. It is the only large European country for which we have marriage and birth statistics by age
of the spouses/parents before the first world war.
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of the singles pool after the war.
We implement these insights in the model by assuming that fertility depends on both the
age and the type of the woman. The type indexes permanent diﬀerences in the desire (or
ability) of women to have children. We also assume that the value of a marriage is increasing
in the number of children born to the couple. Matching is through the competitive-search
mechanism: men decide which age and type of woman to court, knowing that they will get
a smaller share of the value of the marriage from courting the most popular women. Thus,
at an equilibrium of the marriage market, women with a higher desire (or ability) to have
children marry at a higher rate.
Using a simple static example, we show that, when men are in excess supply, an increase
in the quality of the pool of single women causes both male and female marriage rates to
increase. This is critical because under the constant-returns-to-scale assumption that our
model shares with almost all other papers in the matching literature, the marriage-rate boom
cannot be explained by the presence of an unusually large singles pool. The lower post-war
sex ratio, on the other hand, tends to reduce female marriage rates, which, in the full model,
helps to explain why marriage rates of young women fall back to trend more quickly than
the corresponding male marriage rates.
Our quantitative strategy is as follows. First, we calibrate the steady state of the model
to match the age profiles of the marital status of men and women, as well as the birth-
rate age-profile of married couples. Second, we compute a post-war distribution of men
and women by marital status, and of married couples by already-born children. We do this
by imposing that, starting from the steady state, the economy faces four years of reduced
marriage, reduced birth rates, and increased male mortality, aﬀecting all types equally by
age. Third, we use this post-war distribution as the initial condition from which we compute
equilibrium transition paths for marriage and birth rates. We then compare marriage and
birth statistics drawn from the transition path of the model to empirical analogues drawn
from French vital statistics over the 1920-1935 period.
We find that the model generates a large increase in marriage and fertility rates after the
war. The shares of the marriage-rate boom explained by the model ranges from 58% to
82%, depending upon gender and age group. The model explains 59% and 79% of the
increase in fertility for 20-29 and 30-39 year-old married women, respectively. The model is
also consistent with the protracted nature of the transition of marriage and fertility rates.
Marriage rates in the model do not converge back to their trend until 1925 or later. The
persistence of excess marriage rates is particularly pronounced for young men (aged 20-29).
The marital birth rate also exhibits a slow transition in the model. Finally, the model also
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reproduces the fact that women’s marriage rates return more quickly to trend than those of
men, as can be observed in the French data.
Our approach is complementary to the analysis of the impact of the First World War on
French fertility by Vandenbroucke (2013); however his model abstracts from marriage match-
ing and generates a baby boom after the war that is much larger than in the data. In com-
bination with our approach, which abstracts from the incentives of married couples to have
children, this suggests that marriage-market frictions delayed the response of the French
population to stronger fertility incentives.
Our model is similar in spirit to that of Kennes and Knowles (2012) (KK hereafter), in that
it analyzes fertility and marriage in a competitive-search framework that derives in part from
the labor-market models of Moen (1997) and Peters (1991). However our model extends KK
in that we allow for two-sided heterogeneity, using the methods of Shi (2002) and Shimer
(2005), who extended the competitive-search framework to deal with worker heterogeneity.
Other recent economic analyses of war-related demographics includes Kvasnicka and Beth-
mann (2007), who analyze the eﬀect of the second World War on out-of-wedlock births in
Germany. There is also a rapidly growing literature on the impact of war on female labor
supply, such as Doepke et al. (2007), who also consider the impact of labor demand on
fertility, but abstract from marriage markets. Economic models have also proved useful for
understanding fertility fluctuations, as demonstrated by Jones and Schoonbroodt (2010) and
Greenwood et al. (2005), but that work also abstracts from the marriage-market mechanism
that we stress here.
More generally, our work is also related to other marriage models that stress the role of aging
and diﬀerential fecundity, such as Siow (1998) and Giolito (2010). However the focus of that
work is on the division of labor in the household. Coles and Francesconi (2011) and Regalia
and Ríos-Rull (1999) also develop models of aging in the marriage market, but their focus
is on wage inequality.
In Section 2 below we review the data on marriage and births in France in the post-war era.
We explain our hypotheses in Section 3, and in Section 4 we present a simple, one-period
model to outline some of the basic mechanisms of our model. We present the full, dynamic
model in Section 5 and our quantitative analysis in Section 6. We conclude in Section 7.
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2 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
In this section we break down marriage and birth rates by age to show that the eﬀects of
the war-time disruption of family life were much longer-lasting than is apparent from the
aggregate statistics. In particular, we find that marriage and birth rates of the younger-
non-mobilized cohorts were also disrupted, and that some of these eﬀects are still apparent
in the 1930s.
Marriage statistics are available from the French National Institute for Statistics and Eco-
nomic Studies (Insee). Bunle (1954) also provides a wealth of monthly statistics on marriages.
Mitchell (1998) provides statistics for the aggregate marriage and birth rates. As far as we
know, the relevant data are only available in the form of statistics, not at the individual
level. This is a significant limitation, one that applies to all European countries at this time,
but France is unique in that the statistics are crossed with age, whereas the UK, Italy and
Germany do not provide marriage and birth rates by age before the 1930s.
Figure 1 shows aggregate marriage and birth rates in France, from 1801 to 1990. We consider
the marriage rates first. It takes about 5 years after the Franco-Prussian war of 1870 for
marriage rates to return to normal, 10 years after World War I, and 5 years after World War
II. In contrast to the aftermath of the French invasion of Russia in 1812, where the post-war
adjustment is comparatively rapid, these wars are associated with prolonged disruption due
to the protracted presence of hostile forces on French soil. Turning to the birth rates, there
is a noticeable trough during World War I, followed by a rebound above trend which lasted
until the late 1930s. A less pronounced trough coincides with the Franco-Prussian war.3
In Figure 2, where we break down marriage rates by age and sex, we see that the post-
war disruption is of longer duration than that suggested by the aggregate marriage rate.
What is particularly intriguing in this figure is that it demonstrates that young cohorts who
were not mobilized appear to also exhibit a significant disruption in marriage patterns. For
example, the marriage rate of 20-29 year-old men in the late 1920s is markedly above its
pre-war trend, while this cohort was too young, in 1914, to have been mobilized and have
its marriage decisions perturbed by the onset of the war.
A stylized presentation of the qualitative feature of marriage rates after their post-war peak
is:
• 20-29 year-old men: Marriage rates remain above trend until the mid-1930s
• 30-39 year-old men: Marriage rates revert to trend in the mid-1920s
3The baby boom in France, visible in Figure 1, started in the early 1940s.
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• 20-29 year-old women: Marriage rates fell sharply in the early 1920s. They remain
slightly below trend thereafter.
• 30-39 year-old women: Marriage rates revert to trend in the early 1920s. They remain
on trend thereafter.
Henry (1966) shows that despite the shortage of men, the fraction of French women of the
mobilized birth cohorts who ended up marrying by age 50 was surprisingly similar to that
of the pre-war cohorts. These women adapted, he argues, in several diﬀerent ways, but
the principal one was that they selected husbands from younger birth cohorts. His results,
summarized in Table 1 below, show that the increase in intercohort marriages accounts for
about 52-64% of the deviation of marriage patterns in response to the war. He ignores
however the impact on the women of the younger cohorts of this pre-empting by the older
women of younger men. Our empirical analysis suggests that women of successive birth
cohorts followed the suit of the mobilized cohort by marrying younger men, thus transmitting
the shortage of men to the non-mobilized cohorts.
Figure 3 conveys a similar message for birth rates; when broken down by age group, the
marital fertility rate remains about 25% higher than trend well into the 1930s. Relative to
what the aggregate birth rate of Figure 1 suggests, this is a large and persistent shift in birth
rates that extends to women too young to be directly aﬀected by wartime postponement of
births. That this is driven by new marriage is suggested by the youth of the parents relative
to the married population4.
3 HYPOTHESES
As we mentioned Section 1, matching models with constant-returns-to-scale matching tech-
nologies (as in most of the matching literature) but no heterogeneity would imply, through a
low post-war sex ratio, a counterfactual drop in women’s marriage rates. Thus, we consider
that, within the framework of constant-returns-to-scale matching technologies, the post-war
response of marriage and birth rates is evidence of unobservable heterogeneity in the propen-
sity of women to have children. We take as given that marriages and births decline during
the war as the result of disruptions that are independent of the type of the women. Our
hypothesis is that an extended period of disruption gives rise to an unusually strong concen-
tration in the singles pool of women with a high propensity to have children, because these
women are much more likely to marry than other women.
4Ideally one would examine births by duration of the marriage; unfortunately such data is not available.
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To demonstrate this concentration eﬀect, let’s assume that there are two types of women,
and that the ratio of their marriage rates remains constant during a war. Let mi be the
marriage rate of type-i women. We assume that m2 > m1, so that the type-2 women are
those with the high propensity to marry and have children. Let Pi be the population of single
women of type i. In a steady state, Pi = (1 mi)Pi+  where   is the annual inflow of new
singles, which we assume to be independent of types. Thus, in a steady state, Pi =  /mi,
implying P2 < P1.
Think now of a 1-period disruption of the matching process, where the marriage rates are
multiplied by 0 < x < 1. The post-disruption distribution becomes P 0i = Pi (1 mix) +  
which we can write as P 0i = Pi +   (1  x) . The ratio of types becomes
P 02/P
0
1 = [P2 +   (1  x)] / [P1 +   (1  x)]
so that P 02/P 01 > P2/P1 whenever 0 < x < 1. In this way, a war, to the extent that it depresses
marriage rates uniformly, increases the proportion of high-type women in the pool of single
women.
This increase in the proportion of type-2 women can potentially explain why marriage rates
for women do not decline, despite the fall in the sex ratio. It also implies that birth rates
for married couples will be higher after the war. We hypothesize that these eﬀects are
transmitted to younger generations through intensified competition for husbands, as the
older high-propensity women displace younger, low-propensity women by marrying younger
men.
We implement our hypotheses in two steps: first we present a simple static model to analyze
the eﬀects on marriages and births of the unusual post-war singles pool. To explore the
inter-temporal transmission, and compare our model’s predictions with post-war data, we
then develop a dynamic model that nests our static model within each period.
4 A SIMPLE EXAMPLE
Consider an economy that lasts one period and is populated by two continua of singles of
each sex i 2 {H,F}. There are two types of women: zF 2 {1, 2}. There is only one type of
man, with mass PH . Let the mass of women of type zF be PF (zF ). We use p (zF ) and sH
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to represent the proportion of women of type zF and the sex ratio, respectively:
p (zF ) =
PF (zF )
PF (1) + PF (2)
sH =
PH
PF (1) + PF (2)
.
Matching and the allocation of surpluses are determined by a competitive-search mechanism,
as in Shi (2002). All agents may enter the marriage market, where matches are made between
agents of opposite sexes. Men pay a stochastic cost ⇠ to participate. We assume that ⇠ is
identically and independently distributed with cumulative distribution function  , and that
it is drawn at the beginning of the period, before the participation decisions of men are made.
All women enter the market, where they are assigned to a sub-market zF corresponding to
their type. Participating men choose which sub-market to enter.
Let the mass of men who enter sub-market zF be denotedN (zF ). In each sub-market men are
allocated randomly to the women. We define the “queue length” as   (zF ) ⌘ N (zF ) /PF (zF ),
that is the ratio of men per zF -women in sub-market zF . Then, the probability distribution
!n (zF ) over the number n of suitors per zF -woman is given by a standard formula:
!n (zF ) =
[  (zF )]
n e  (zF )
n!
.
The probability that a type-zF woman has no suitors is, therefore, !0 (zF ) = e  (zF ). Let
⇢ (zF ) be the probability that a type-zF woman marries with a man:
⇢ (zF ) ⌘   [1  !0 (zF )]
where   2 [0, 1] represents an additional friction: the probability of marrying conditional on
a match.5
Let x (zF ) > 0 denote the surplus of a marriage. We assume that the output of unmatched
agents, the autarky value, is zero. Women post wages w (zF )  x (zF ) that they will award to
the man they marry. This wage is common knowledge. If a woman has more than one suitor,
then she chooses among them at random. We assume that the surplus satisfies x (1) < x (2),
so that the surplus from a marriage with a type-2 woman is larger.
5This matching mechanism is quite standard in the competitive-search literature (e.g. Shimer (2005)),
where it is known as the “urn-ball” mechanism.
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4.1 Optimization
Let vH denote the expected value of participating for a man. Because of the entry cost,
there is a marginal man that is indiﬀerent between participation and non-participation. We
denote the entry cost of the marginal man by ⇠⇤. A man participates in the marriage market
if and only if his cost is less than that of the marginal man: ⇠  ⇠⇤. Since we assume that
the cost ⇠ is identically and independently distributed, the fraction of men participating is
  (⇠⇤).
The total number of marriages type-zF women is ⇢ (zF )P (zF ) . Thus, the rate at which
men marry in sub-market zF is ⇢ (zF )P (zF ) /N (zF ) = ⇢ (zF ) /  (zF ) . It follows that, given
the wages posted by women, the expected value of entering the sub-market zF for a man,
conditional on participating, is
EH (zF ) =
⇢ (zF )
  (zF )
w (zF ) .
Type-zF women post wage oﬀers so as to maximize their expected gains from marriage.6
Participating men must weakly prefer entering sub-market zF , so the optimization problem
is:
vF (zF ) = max
w(zF )
⇢ (zF ) [x (zF )  w (zF )] (1)
s.t. vH  EH (zF ) (2)
Note that the marriage rate of women of type zF is ⇢ (zF ), and that the marriage rate of
men is a weighted average of the rate at which they marry in each sub-market: ⇡MH =
P 1H
P
zF
N (zF )
⇢(zF )
 (zF )
.
4.2 Equilibrium
A matching equilibrium consists of a value for men vH , a queue vector   (zF ), and a cost
threshold ⇠⇤ such that:
1. Men and women are optimizing:
(a) The queue vector solves (1)-(2), given vH .
6Burdett et al. (2001) show that this mechanism can be derived as the limiting case of a strategic wage-
posting game.
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(b) The marginal man is indiﬀerent between participation and non-participation: ⇠⇤ =
vH .
2. Markets clear:
(a) The demand for men equals the supply:   (zF )PF (zF ) = N (zF ) .
(b) The allocation of men to women is feasible:
P
zF
N (zF )  PH  (⇠⇤) .
Note that the equilibrium of this model can be represented as a linear equation system .
Our solution method, which we also use in solving the dynamic model, is described in the
appendix.
4.3 Analytical Results
We analyze the eﬀects of two consequences of a war: a drop in the sex ratio and an increase
in the proportion of type-2 single women. We analyze the eﬀect of the sex ratio for the simple
reason that, in wars, men die more than women. We analyze the eﬀect of an increase in the
proportion of type-2 single women because we argue that this is also a key consequence of a
war –see Section 3.
Combining the optimality conditions (1a) and (1b) yields first-order conditions for women
of type zF :
 e  (zF )x (zF ) = ⇠⇤ (3)
from which we deduce an indiﬀerence condition for men:
e  (1)x (1) = e  (2)x (2) . (4)
Note that Equation (3) implies that, when x (2) > x (1) , the queue length in the type-2
sub-market is longer than in the type-1 sub-market, that is type-2 women marry at a higher
rate. Combining (4) with the market clearing conditions (2a) and (2b) yields two expression
for the market clearing conditions
  (1) + p (2) ln
✓
x (2)
x (1)
◆
= sH  (⇠
⇤) (5)
and
  (2)  p (1) ln
✓
x (2)
x (1)
◆
= sH  (⇠
⇤) . (6)
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Figure 5 shows the determination of an equilibrium (panel A) and the eﬀect of an increase
in the proportion of type-2 women, p (2), and/or a decrease in the sex ratio, sH (panel B).
The first, direct eﬀect, is a shift of the market clearing conditions toward shorter queue
lengths. This implies that, holding the male participation rate constant, an increase in the
proportion of type-2 women and/or a decrease in the sex ratio both reduce the queue length
in the type-1 and type-2 sub-markets, which causes female marriage rates to fall.
In Figure 5 this is represented by the shift from A to B. There is, however, an indirect
equilibrium eﬀect that mitigates the decrease in the queue lengths. This is represented by
the shifts from B to C: men increase their participation which implies an increase in the queue
lengths. In the new equilibrium represented by C, queues are shorter in each sub-market
and men’s participation has increased.
When we consider an increase in the proportion of type-2 women, the average marriage rate
of women also changes because of a composition eﬀect. This rate is a weighted sum of the
type-specific marriage rates: p (1)  
 
1  e  (1)  + p (2)    1  e  (2)  . Since type-2 women
marry at a higher rate, increasing their proportion raises the average marriage rate of women.
Whether this eﬀect can oﬀset the decrease in type-specific marriage rates discussed above is
a quantitative question, which we deal with in Section 4.4 below.
Note that the participation cost for men is the aspect of the model that is critical for the
composition of the female population to aﬀect marriage rates. Without it, all men always
participate in the marriage market. Consider a world where all the women are the same; if
we increase the surplus a woman generates in marriage, there will be no impact on marriage
rates if all men always participate, because the queue length will be constant. Therefore an
increase in female “quality” is not on its own suﬃcient to generate an increase in marriage
rates.
4.4 A Numerical Example
What happens to the equilibrium marriage rates as the fraction of high-surplus women in
the singles pool increases? As we have shown above, this depends on the parameters we use
since diﬀerent forces tend to move marriage rates in opposite directions. In this section we
show, by way of a numerical example, that the average marriage rate of women can increase
when the fraction of high-surplus women increase.7
7We also argued earlier that, holding constant the marriage-rate ratio, a prolonged disruption of the
marriage market increases the proportion of high-propensity women in the singles pool. In the context of
our model, we can represent the disruption by a temporary decrease in  , the probability of a marriage
given a match. Equation (3) implies that a decrease in   leads to a decrease in both male participation
10
Figure 6 displays the equilibrium values of various quantities in the model as we increase
the proportion of type-2 women. We assume a log-normal distribution for the participation
cost. The parameters used for the example are shown in Table 2.
The top-left panel of Figure 6 shows that as p (2) varies from 0 to 1, the marriage rates
decline because the queue lengths decline. This is despite the fact that the cost threshold
increases, as we see in the top-right panel. Nevertheless, the female marriage rate increases
overall from about 20% to about 40%, because the type-2 marry at a higher rate. The male
marriage rates also increase, at a faster rate than the female, because the male participation
rate has increased.
We demonstrate the impact of composition of the female population on fertility by assuming
that type-2 women have a higher birth rate (0.5) than the type-1 (0.25) when married. The
bottom-right panel of Figure 6 shows the birth rate per married woman rising from 7% to
13% as the fraction of type-2 women increases from 0 to 1. The birth-rate increase is due
to both the direct eﬀect of the increase in high-fertility females and the increasing overall
marriage rate.
5 THE DYNAMIC MODEL
In the example model, changes in composition of the female population were shown to
generate significant changes in marriage and birth rates. In this section, we extend the
analysis to a dynamic model so that we can think of the impact on a succession of birth
cohorts. The male type of the static example will correspond to age, and the female type
will correspond to age and fertility propensity. As females age, their fecundity will decline,
reducing the marriage surplus, but as males age, we will assume the marital surplus increases.
5.1 Demography
Time is discrete. There is an infinite succession of periods, and a population composed of
men and women. There are two types of women: z 2 Z = {1, 2}, where z indexes the
intensity of their desire to raise children. There is only one type of man.
rates and queue lengths and, therefore, marriage rates fall. It turns out however that the marriage-rate ratio
falls, which tends to reduce the concentration of high-propensity women. To see this, note that Equation
(3) implies that the queue length in sub-market zF writes   (zF ) = ln (x (zF ))   ln (⇠⇤) + ln ( ) . Since
x (1) < x (2), we have ln (x (1))  ln (⇠⇤) < ln (x (2))  ln (⇠⇤), implying that a decrease in   lowers   (1) more
than it does   (2), proportionately.
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Over time, individuals become diﬀerentiated along two dimensions. First, their marital
status: they can be either married or single, designated by M and S. Second, individuals
transition stochastically through three “stages,” a 2 A = {1, 2, 3}, as they age. Stages of life
serve two purposes in our model. First, they matter for the determination of an individual’s
utility as a single. Second, and for women only, stages of life aﬀect their ability to have
children once they are married. Married women in the first stage of their lives are the
most “fertile,” while married women in the third stage are “sterile.” The probability that an
individual in stage a < 3 transitions into stage a+1 is denoted by  a. Stage 3 is an absorbing
state. We assume that each individual starts life as a single in stage 1, and that marriage is
an absorbing state. Each period, there is a flow  H,t of new single men in the first stage of
their lives and a flow  F,t (z) of new single women of type z in the first stage of their lives.
The state of an unmarried man is given by the stage of life he is currently in. We use sH 2 A
to refer to it. The state of an unmarried woman is given by her type and the stage of life
she is currently in: sF 2 Z ⇥A. Married couples are identified by the wife’s state and the
number of children already born, i.e. a pair (sF , k) 2 {Z ⇥A} ⇥ {0, 1, . . . , K} where K is
the maximum number of children a couple can have. We assume that married people can
have one child per period and single individual cannot have children. The probability that
a married couple (sF , k) has a child in a given period is denoted by f (sF , k). Our approach
of fertility is complementary to that of Vandenbroucke (2013), who models the incentives of
married couples to have children; we focus instead on the incentives for marriage, as implied
by expected future fertility.
5.2 Marriages Value and Autarky
Single individuals produce utility ySi (si), where i 2 {H,F} . We assume that for men in
the second stage of their lives, the utility of remaining single is lower than for men in the
first stage: ySH (2) < ySH (1). Marriages produce utility yM (sF , k) > 0 each period, which is
perfectly transferable between spouses. Married people like children, that is yM (sF , k + 1) >
yM (sF , k). Furthermore, the utility gain from each child is assumed to be increasing in the
woman’s type z. Thus, for any a 2 A, if s0F = {2, a} and sF = {1, a}, then yM (s0F , k + 1) 
yM (s0F , k) > y
M (sF , k + 1)  yM (sF , k). As children can only be produced in marriage, this
means that it is more important for high-z women to marry early.
Let Y (sF , k) denote the value of a marriage in state (sF , k). Since sterility, i.e. sF = {z, 3},
is an absorbing state, the value of a sterile marriage with k children equals the present
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discounted sum of the utility flow of remaining in the marriage forever:
Y ({z, 3} , k) = y
M ({z, 3} , k)
1   
where   is the discount factor between periods. Since couples with K children are eﬀectively
sterile, we can also denote their value by the present discounted sum of the utility flow of
remaining in the marriage forever:
Y (sF , K) =
yM (sF , K)
1    .
Using these expressions we can derive the value of any (sF , k) marriage where k < K and
a < 3 as
Y (sF , k) = (1  f (sF , k))
⇥
yM (sF , k) +   [(1   a)Y (sF , k) +  aY (sF + 1, k)]
⇤
+ f (sF , k)
⇥
yM (sF , k + 1) +   [(1   a)Y (sF , k + 1) +  aY (sF + 1, k + 1)]
⇤
where we used the convention that sF + 1 means {z, a+ 1} whenever sF = {z, a}. Consider
now an agent who never participates in a marriage market. Let the value of this be Ai (si),
i 2 {H,F}, where sH (3) = ySH(3)/(1   ), and sF ({z, 3}) = ySF ({z, 3})/(1   ) and
Ai (si) = y
S
i (si) +   [(1   )Ai (si) +  aAi (si + 1)]
and where, again, we used the convention that sF +1 means {z, a+1} whenever sF = {z, a}.
5.3 Matching and Marriage Rates
The matching mechanism involves directed search, in the spirit of Shi (2002) and Shimer
(2005). Specifically men direct their search for a spouse toward sub-markets of women of
type sF . In sub-market sF , a woman posts a wage oﬀer wt (sF , sH) that she will pay to
her husband. The wage oﬀer is common knowledge and women are able to commit to their
oﬀers. Matching in a given sub-market occurs through the random assignment of men to
women, using the urn-ball mechanism, as described in section 4.
5.3.1 Matching
At the beginning of period t the population of singles of sex i and state si is denoted by
Pi,t (si) . Men pay a cost ⇠ to enter the marriage market. We assume that ⇠ is iid with CDF
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 , and that it is drawn at the beginning of each period, before the participation decision
is made. All women participate in the market, where they are assigned to a sub-market
sF corresponding to their state. Men choose which sub-market to enter. Let the mass of
sH-men who enter sub-market sF be denoted Nt (sF , sH).
The “queue length” or “market-tightness” in sub-market sF is
 t (sF , sH) ⌘ Nt (sF , sH)
PF,t (sF )
.
The urn-ball mechanism implies that the probability distribution !n,t (sF , sH) over the num-
ber n of sH-suitors per sF -woman is given by:
!n,t (sF , sH) =
[ t (sF , sH)]
n e  t(sF ,sH)
n!
.
The probability that there are no sH-suitors for an sF -woman is !0,t (sF , sH) = e  t(sF ,sH).
Let ⇢t (sF , sH) be the probability that an sF -woman marries with an sH-man. A woman
matches with a 2-man whenever at least one suitor is a 2-man. Thus
⇢t (sF , 2) =   [1  !0,t (sF , 2)] , (7)
where   is the probability of marriage conditional on a match. A woman matches with a
1-man whenever she has at least one suitor of this type and no type-2 suitor:
⇢t (sF , 1) =  !0,t (sF , 2) (1  !0,t (sF , 1)) . (8)
5.3.2 Marriage Rates
Women The total number of marriages by sF -women is [⇢t (sF , 1) + ⇢t (sF , 2)]PF,t (sF ) .
Thus, the marriage rate of these women is ⇡FF,t (sF ) = ⇢t (sF , 1) + ⇢t (sF , 2) , which is also
⇡F,t (sF ) =   [1  !0,t (sF , 2)!0,t (sF , 1)] , (9)
i.e., the probability that they have at least one suitor.
Men The number of marriages between sH-men and sF -women is ⇢t (sF , sH)PF,t (sF ). This
implies that the rate at which sH-men marry in market sF is
⇢t (sF , sH)PF,t (sF )
Nt (sF , sH)
=
⇢t (sF , sH)
 t (sF , sH)
.
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The marriage rate for sH-men can, thus, be written as
⇡H,t (sH) =
X
sF
nt (sF , sH)
⇢t(sF , sH)
 t(sF , sH)
(10)
where
nt (sF , sH) =
Nt (sF , sH)P
sF
Nt (sF , sH)
is the proportion of sH-men in market sF . Note that ⇡H,t (sH) is the marriage rate of men,
conditional on participating. The unconditional marriage rate of single men is
⇡H,t (sH)µt (sH)
where µt (sH) is the probability of participation, i.e. the fraction of sH-men participating in
the marriage market.
5.3.3 Laws of Motion
Given marriage and participation rates, the laws of motion for the population of single
aH = 1 men is
PH,t+1 (1) = (1   1) [1  ⇡H,t (1)µt (1)]PH,t (1) +  H , (11)
that is, the number single, aH = 1 men at date t+1 comes from the date t single in stage 1
that did not transition into stage 2 and did not get married, and from the flow of new single
of age 1. For aH = 2-men we have
PH,t+1 (2) = (1   2) [1  ⇡H,t (2)µt (2)]PH,t (2) +  1 [1  ⇡H,t (1)µt (1)]PH,t (1) . (12)
Thus, the number single, aH = 2 men at date t+ 1 comes from the date t single in stage 2
that did not transition into stage 3 and did not get married, and from single in stage 1 at
date t that transitioned into sage 2 but did not get married.
For women, these laws can be written as
PF,t+1 ({z, 1}) = (1   1) [1  ⇡F,t ({z, 1})]PF,t ({z, 1}) +  F (z) (13)
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for {z, 1}-women, and
PF,t+1 ({z, 2}) = (1   2) [1  ⇡F,t ({z, 2})]PF,t ({z, 2}) +  1 [1  ⇡F,t ({z, 1})]PF,t ({z, 1})
(14)
for {z, 2}-women.
5.4 Value Functions
5.4.1 Men
Let VH,t (sH) denote the value of a man who has decided to participate in the market. Let
RH,t (sH) denote the value of remaining single and vH,t (sH) denote the expected gain from
marrying during the period. We have
VH,t (sH) = RH,t (sH) + vH,t (sH) .
To define the value of remaining single for men we proceed as follows. First, we note that
sH-men enter the market if and only if ⇠  vH,t (sH), that is if and only if their expected gain
from marrying conditional on participating is at least as large as the cost of participating.
We use the notation ⇠⇤t (sH) = vH,t (sH) to denote the marginal sH-man that is exactly
indiﬀerent between participation and non-participation. Thus, the probability that an sH-
man participates, µt (sH), is
µt (sH) =   (⇠
⇤
t (sH)) . (15)
Since ⇠ is iid, µt (sH) is also the proportion of sH-men participating in the marriage market
at date t. Before the realization of the cost, the ex-ante value of period t for an sH-man is
then
WH,t (sH) = (1  µt (sH))RH,t (sH) + µt (sH)E [VH,t (sH)  ⇠ |⇠  ⇠⇤t (sH) ] ,
which is also
WH,t (sH) = (1  µt (sH))RH,t (sH) + µt (sH) [VH,t (sH)  ⇣t (sH)] ,
where ⇣t (sH) ⌘ E [⇠ |⇠  ⇠⇤t (sH) ] is the expected cost conditional on participating. Then,
the value of remaining single for a man is
RH,t (sH) = y
S
H (sH) +   [(1   sH )WH,t+1 (sH) +  sHWH,t+1 (sH + 1)] . (16)
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Note that RH,t (3) = WH,t (3) = AH (3) .
5.4.2 Women
Let VF,t (sF ) denote the value of a woman at the beginning of period t. Let RF,t (sF ) denote
the value of remaining single and vF,t (sF ) denote the expected gain from marrying during
the period. We have
VF,t (sF ) = RF,t (sF ) + vF,t (sF ) ,
and
RF,t (sF ) = y
S
F (sF ) +   [(1   sF )VF,t+1 (sF ) +  sFVF,t+1 (sF + 1)] . (17)
A woman chooses to post wages so as to maximize her expected gain from marrying, subject
to the constraint that participating men must receive their expected values. Thus vF,t (sF )
is defined by the following optimization problem
vF,t (sF ) = max
wt(sF ,sH)
X
sH
⇢t (sF , sH) [xt (sF , sH)  wt (sF , sH)] (18)
s.t. vH,t (sH) =
⇢t (sF , sH)
 t (sF , sH)
wt (sF , sH) , (19)
where the surplus xt (sF , sH) is defined by the output of a marriage, net of the reservation
values of the husband and the wife:
xt (sF , sH) = Y (sF , 0) RH,t (sH) RF,t (sF ) . (20)
5.5 Equilibrium
A recursive equilibrium of the model is a sequence of queue vectors { t (sF , sH)}, cost thresh-
olds {⇠⇤t (sH)}, expected values {vH,t (sH) , vF,t (sF )} for men and women, respectively, reser-
vation values {RH,t (sH) , RF,t (sF )} , for men and women, and populations of single men and
women {PH,t (sH) , PF,t (sF )} such that at each date t:
1. Men and women are optimizing:
(a) The reservation value of men satisfies Equation (16).
(b) The reservation value of women satisfies Equation (17).
(c) Women solve problem (18)-(19).
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(d) The marginal man is indiﬀerent between participation and non-participation:
⇠⇤t (sH) = vH,t (sH) .
2. Markets clear:
(a) The demand for men equals the supply:  t (sF , sH)PFt (sF ) = Nt (sF , sH) .
(b) The allocation of men to women is feasible:
P
sF
Nt (sF , sH)    (⇠⇤t (sH))PH,t (sH) .
3. The population of singles follows the laws of motion in Equations (11)-(14).
6 QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS
6.1 Calibration
We use the following functional forms for the output of a marriage
yM ({z, aF} , k) = ↵0 + ↵1 ln (1 + k) ,
where ↵0 and ↵1 are non-negative. Note that we assume that the output of a marriage
depends only upon the number of children. For fertility we assume
f ({z, aF} , k) = fz
fz + fafk
,
where fz, fa, and fk are non-negative.
We choose parameter values for the model in two ways. Some parameters can be set a
priori on the basis of previous literature. An annual discount rate of 4% is standard in the
macroeconomic literature because it generates an average rate of return that matches the
risk-free interest rate. Similarly the expected duration of fecundity, as of age 18, is 22 years
according to Trussell and Wilson (1985). We set the transition probability   = 0.1 so as to
generate 20 years of fecundity on average. The inflow rate of women is set to   = 0.1 so as
to keep the population size constant.
The remaining parameter values are chosen so that the model generates steady-state age
profiles for marriage and births that match those in the data. The empirical counterparts
consists of averages for French pre-war vital statistics, as described in the empirical analysis
of section 2.
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This strategy leaves one important parameter unidentified: the variance  ⇠ of the participa-
tion cost, which we set to 0.1. The smaller the variance, the greater the response of male
participation to the quality of the single females pool. In future versions we plan to identify
this parameter using the results for other wars where the extent of marital disruption diﬀered
from the First World War.
Figure 7 show the profiles of married men and women, by age, as well as birth rates compared
with their empirical counterpart. The calibrated values of the model parameters are shown
in Table 3.
6.2 The Main Experiment
6.2.1 The war
The first step in our experiment is to build the post-war distribution of the population. We
proceed as follows. We start from the steady state of our model and assume that, for 4
years, (i) marriages rates are divided by two; (ii) 4% of men die each year; (iii) the fertility
of married couples is divided by two. Under these assumptions we derive the post-war
composition of the population, which serves as the initial condition from which we compute
a transition path.
Our assumption that marriage rates are divided by two during the war is motivated by the
data of Figure 2 which show that early in the war marriages rates fell by about 50%. Our
assumption that 4% of men die each year is motivated by data on military casualties during
the war –see Huber (1931). Of the 8.5 million men mobilized. 16% died, i.e. about 4% per
year for four years. Finally, our assumption that the fertility of married couples was divided
by two is also motivated by data on marital fertility during the war.
6.2.2 The results
Figure 8 shows the results of the experiment. It displays marriage rates relative to their
steady state in the model, and marriage rates relative to their pre-war trend in the data.
We start with a qualitative discussion of these results. The model generates an increase in
marriage rates for men and women, and for the two age groups that we consider. For 20-29
year-old men, the data show that marriage rates remain above trend (that is 1 in Figure
8) until the mid-1930s. The model generate a faster-than-observed return to trend, which
is almost completed by 1925. For 30-39 year-old men, the pace of the return to trend is
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similar in the model and the data. That is, by 1925 most of the convergence has occurred
and marriage rates remain close to trend.
The marriage rate of 20-29 year-old women declines sharply from its peak in the early 1920s.
It then remains slightly below trend. The model is consistent both with the initial decline
and its timing, and with the lower-than-trend rates of the subsequent years. For 30-39 year
old women, marriage rate revert to trend in the early 1920s, and remain on trend afterward.
The model exhibits a slower decline that is completed in the late 1920s. It remains close to
trend afterward.
Table 4 summarizes this discussion quantitatively. The table shows the ratio of the model
and data lines of Figure 8. Our model predicts, 69% of the deviation from trend of the
marriage rates of 20-29 year-old men in 1920. For 30-39 year-old men it predicts 58% of the
deviation from trend. For young and old women these figures are 82 and 71%, respectively.
In the years following the 1920 peak, the deviation from trend generated by our model remain
in the neighborhood of the actual deviation. For 20-29 year old men, in 1930, for instance,
the model predicts 94% of the actual deviation.
To understand these results we note that our model implies that the queue lengths in the
aF = 1-markets start above their steady state values immediately after the war, but then
fell and remain below their steady state value, exhibiting a slow convergence back to steady
state. This is an indication that young women do not attract men after the war as they used
to. This is, in part, due to the competition of older women, that is aF = 2-women, who face
longer queues of young men after the war. Indeed, our results show that queues of young
(aH = 1) men in the markets for older (aF = 2) women are above their steady state values
after the war.
Figure 9 shows the time path of marital birth rates in the data and the model. The model
predicts above trend birth rates in 1920, as observed in the data, due to the peak in marriages
of high-type women at this time. The model birth rate is 79 percent of the actual birth rate of
20-29 years-old married-women in 1920 (59 percent for 30-39 years-old). The model predicts
a slow return to trend of the birth rates.
7 CONCLUSIONS
This paper explains how cohort-specific demographic shocks are transmitted through the
marriage market to successive birth cohorts. We used the example of France after the First
World War to illustrate the dynamic eﬀects of two consequences of the war: the war-time
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disruption of family life and the post-war shortage of single men due to combat-related
mortality. France is an interesting case because it remained a major theatre of operations
throughout the war. France is also unique in that vital statistics such as marriages and
births are available by age group.
By breaking down the data by age, we were able to show that the disruption of marriage
markets was much longer lasting than apparent from the aggregate data, and that the non-
mobilized younger cohorts were also aﬀected by these events, as evidenced by both the male
marriage rates and the marital fertility rates remaining considerable higher than trend into
the 1930s.
The premise of our theoretical model was that women diﬀer in their birth propensities, and
hence in their gains from marriage. While a small economic literature on diﬀerential fecundity
has developed models in which female aging aﬀects fecundity, this is to our knowledge the
first equilibrium model of marriage that explicitly accounts for diﬀerences in preferences over
births.
We first used a simplified example of the model to show how improved composition of
the female singles pool leads to higher marriage rates; this argument relied on some men
preferring sometimes not to participate in the marriage market.
We then developed a dynamic version of the model that allowed for aging of both men and
women. We calibrated the model’s steady state to match the pre-war age profiles of marital
status and births; this generated a remarkably good fit, despite the simple demographic
structure of the model.
Our main result was that when we shut down family life for 4 years, in imitation of the eﬀects
of the war, the transition dynamics exhibit features similar to those in the French data. We
see marriage rates peak immediately after the war and then eventually decline, and birth
rates remain above trend for many years. Competition for husbands perpetuates the war-
time shocks to future non-mobilized cohorts, as the women with a high-fertility propensity
from older cohorts displace the low-propensity women from the younger cohorts.
We do not take a stand on the nature of the fertility propensity; the model abstracts from fer-
tility decisions altogether. However it is clear that a woman’s preferences, her physical ability
to have children (fecundability), or men’s perceptions of her suitability as a mother could
all influence this propensity. While such distinctions are important, we feel identification
requires a richer data set; this is a question that could pursued using modern surveys such
as the National Survey of Family Growth in the U.S. The main disadvantage relative to our
approach is that while demographic transformations are also present in modern data, these
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appear to be endogenous responses driven by technology and labor-market developments
rather than shocks to demographic composition.
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Female 
Birth Cohort
Predicted 
Spinster 
Rate 
Marriage 
with 
Foreigners
Marriages 
with 
widowers 
and divorces
Reduced 
rate of 
Bachelor-
hood
Inter-cohort 
marriages
Total 
Adjustment
Share of IC 
Marriages
1891-1895 196 2 14.6 14 34.4 65 53%
1896-1900 226 15 10.2 13.6 68.2 107 64%
1901-1905 164 12 1.4 10.2 34.4 58 59%
1906-1910 115 5 0.7 5.8 12.5 24 52%
Table 1: Predicted Spinster Rate per 1000 women and demographic adjustments. Source: Henry(1966)
Parameter Value
marriage surplus  z=1 a=1 5.0
marriage surplus  z=2 a=1 6.9
marriage surplus  z=1,a=2 5.1
marriage surplus  z=2,a=2 7.0
parameter 1 of the cost distribution function 1.4
parameter 2 of the cost distribution function 0.2
SexRatio 0.9
Low Fertility rate 0.3
High Fertility rate 0.5
Table 2: Parameter Values for Simple Model
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Name Value Role
β 0.96 Discount factor
δ 0.1 Transition through stages
ySH(aH) [10.0,2.0,0.0] Output of single men
ySF(aF) [3.0,0.1,0.0] Output of single women
α 5.9 Output of marriage, intercept
α 2 Output of marriage, slope
fa [5.0,2.3] Fertility function, effect of a_{F}
fk [0.09,0.15,0.3] Fertility function, effect of k
fz [0.15,0.4] Fertility function, effect of z
χ 0.2 Inflow of men
χ [0.1,0.1] Inflow of women
σ 0.5 Probability of marriage given match
μ 0.5 Mean of entry cost
σ_χ 0.1 Standard deviation of entry cost
Table 3: Parameter Values for Benchmark Model
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Sample 1913 1920 1925 1930 1935
Men, 20-29 1 0.69 0.8 0.94 1.05
Men, 30-39 1 0.58 0.84 0.89 1.09
Women, 20-29 1 0.82 0.95 0.99 1.05
Women, 30-39 1 0.71 0.94 0.93 1.02
Women, 20-29 1 0.79 1.16 1.15 1.26
Women, 30-39 1 0.59 0.76 0.82 0.87
Annual birth rates per married woman: model/data
Marriage rates relative to trend: model/data
Table 4: The post-war transition, in the model and in the data.
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Figure 1: Aggregate marriage and birth rates, France 1800-1990
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Note: The source of data is Mitchell (1998).
Figure 2: Marriage rates
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Note: The source of data is Bunle (1954), and Insee, etat civil et recensement de population. The dotted
line represent the pre-war trend.
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Figure 3: Birth per married women
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Note: The source of data is Insee, etat civil et recensement de population.
Figure 4: Single men per Single woman
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Note: The source of data is Insee, etat civil et recensement de population.
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Figure 5: Determination of Equilibrium and the Eﬀects of Increasing the Proportion of
type-2 Women and/or Decreasing the Sex Ratio
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Figure 6: Example: Comparative Statics
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Figure 7: Fraction of married men and women, and birth rates in steady state of benchmark
model and data
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Note: The source of data is Insee, etat civil et recensement de population. The pre-war data are averages
for the years 1901-1913.
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Figure 8: Marriage rates relative to pre-war trend, model and data
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Figure 9: Birth per married women, model and data
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A THE STATIC EQUILIBRIUM OF THE DYNAMIC
MODEL
We solve the static equilibrium using a Newton-based algorithm augmented to handle the
possibility of corner solutions, i.e. when some markets are inactive. The computations are
simplified by the following considerations. First, recall that
⇢ (sF , 1) =  e
  (sF ,2)  1  e  (sF ,1) 
⇢ (sF , 2) =  
 
1  e  (sF ,2) 
so that
@⇢ (sF , 1) /@  (sF , 1) =  e
  (sF ,2)e  (sF ,1)
@⇢ (sF , 1) /@  (sF , 2) =   e  (sF ,2)
 
1  e  (sF ,1) 
@⇢ (sF , 2) /@  (sF , 1) = 0
@⇢ (sF , 2) /@  (sF , 2) =  e
  (sF ,2)
The optimization problem of a woman can be written as, after substituting out w (sF , sH)
using the constraint,
max
 (sF ,sH)
⇢ (sF , 1) x (sF , 1)    (sF , 1) vH (1) + ⇢ (sF , 2) x (sF , 2)    (sF , 2) vH (2)
At an interior, the first-order conditions of this problem are:
  (sF , 1) : 0 =  e
  (sF ,2)e  (sF ,1)x (sF , 1)  vH (1)
  (sF , 2) : 0 =   e  (sF ,2)
 
1  e  (sF ,1)  x (sF , 1) +  e  (sF ,2)x (sF , 2)  vH (2) .
  e  (sF ,2)  1  e  (sF ,1)  x (sF , 1) +  e  (sF ,2)x (sF , 2) = vH (2)
It is convenient to re-write these equations as
  (sF , 1) : 0 =    (sF , 2)    (sF , 1)  ln

vH (1) / 
x (sF , 1)
 
  (sF , 2) : 0 =    (sF , 2)  ln

vH (2) / 
x (sF , 2)  (1  e  (sF ,1)) x (sF , 1)
 
.
We can now express the static equilibrium as a system of 10 equations in 10 unknown
variables. The unknown are 8 queue lengths,  , and 2 value functions for men, vH . The
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equations consist of 4 first-order conditions for wage posting toward 1-men, four first-order
conditions toward 2-men, and 2 resource constraints.
The first set of first-order conditions is
  ({1, 1} , 1) : 0 =    ({1, 1} , 2)    ({1, 1} , 1)  ln

vH (1) / 
x ({1, 1} , 1)
 
  ({1, 2} , 1) : 0 =    ({1, 2} , 2)    ({1, 2} , 1)  ln

vH (1) / 
x ({1, 2} , 1)
 
  ({2, 1} , 1) : 0 =    ({2, 1} , 2)    ({2, 1} , 1)  ln

vH (1) / 
x ({2, 1} , 1)
 
  ({2, 2} , 1) : 0 =    ({2, 2} , 2)    ({2, 2} , 1)  ln

vH (1) / 
x ({2, 2} , 1)
 
The second set of conditions is
  ({1, 1} , 2) : 0 =    ({1, 1} , 2)  ln

vH (2) / 
x ({1, 1} , 2)  (1  e  ({1,1},1)) x ({1, 1} , 1)
 
  ({1, 2} , 2) : 0 =    ({1, 2} , 2)  ln

vH (2) / 
x ({1, 2} , 2)  (1  e  ({1,2},1)) x ({1, 2} , 1)
 
  ({2, 1} , 2) : 0 =    ({2, 1} , 2)  ln

vH (2) / 
x ({2, 1} , 2)  (1  e  ({2,1},1)) x ({2, 1} , 1)
 
  ({2, 2} , 2) : 0 =    ({2, 2} , 2)  ln

vH (2) / 
x ({2, 2} , 2)  (1  e  ({2,2},1)) x ({2, 2} , 1)
 
The last set of conditions is
vH (1) : 0 =   ({1, 1} , 1)PF ({1, 1}) +   ({1, 2} , 1)PF ({1, 2})
+  ({2, 1} , 1)PF ({2, 1}) +   ({2, 2} , 1)PF ({2, 2})    [vH (1)]PH (1)
vH (2) : 0 =   ({1, 1} , 2)PF ({1, 1}) +   ({1, 2} , 2)PF ({1, 2})
+  ({2, 1} , 2)PF ({2, 1}) +   ({2, 2} , 2)PF ({2, 2})    [vH (2)]PH (2) .
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Let this system of equations be denoted F (X) = 0 where
X =
0BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB@
  ({1, 1} , 1)
  ({1, 2} , 1)
  ({2, 1} , 1)
  ({2, 2} , 1)
  ({1, 1} , 2)
  ({1, 2} , 2)
  ({2, 1} , 2)
  ({2, 2} , 2)
vH (1)
vH (2)
1CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCA
and where the Jacobian, J (X) is
J (X) =
26666666666666666666664
 1 0 0 0  1 0 0 0   1
vH (1)
0
0  1 0 0 0  1 0 0   1
vH (1)
0
0 0  1 0 0 0  1 0   1
vH (1)
0
0 0 0  1 0 0 0  1   1
vH (1)
0
d (1, 1) 0 0 0  1 0 0 0 0   1
vH (2)
0 d (1, 2) 0 0 0  1 0 0 0   1
vH (2)
0 0 d (2, 1) 0 0 0  1 0 0   1
vH (2)
0 0 0 d (2, 2) 0 0 0  1 0   1
vH (2)
PF ({1, 1}) PF ({1, 2}) PF ({2, 1}) PF ({2, 2}) 0 0 0 0 g (1) 0
0 0 0 0 PF ({1, 1}) PF ({1, 2}) PF ({2, 1}) PF ({2, 2}) 0 g (2)
37777777777777777777775
and where
d (z, a) =
 e  ({z,a},1)x ({z, a} , 1)
x ({z, a} , 2)  (1  e  ({z,a},1)) x ({z, a} , 1)
and
g (a) =   0 [vH (a)]PH (a)
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